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Abstract
Beginning in 1920, bird banding in the United States was coordinated by an office within the U.S.
Biological Survey that recruited volunteers, issued permits, distributed bands and reporting forms, and
collected and organized the data that resulted. In the 1920s and 1930s, data from thousands of
volunteers banding millions of birds helped ornithologists map migratory flyaways and census bird
populations on a continental scale. This essay argues that the success of the bird-banding program
depended on a fragile balance between the centripetal effects of national coordination and the centrifugal
effects of volunteer enthusiasm. For various reasons, efforts to maintain this balance were largely
abandoned by the Bird-Banding Office from the late 1930s onward. Nevertheless, the first two decades of
the national bird-banding effort provide an example of how a "citizen-science" project that generates "Big
Data" can produce significant scientific results without subordinating the enthusiasms of volunteers to
the data-collecting needs of professional scientists.
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A Centrifuge of Calculation:
Managing Data and Enthusiasm
in Early Twentieth-Century
Bird Banding
by Etienne S. Benson*
ABSTRACT

Beginning in 1920, bird banding in the United States was coordinated by an ofﬁce
within the U.S. Biological Survey that recruited volunteers, issued permits, distributed bands and reporting forms, and collected and organized the data that resulted.
In the 1920s and 1930s, data from thousands of volunteers banding millions of
birds helped ornithologists map migratory ﬂyways and census bird populations
on a continental scale. This essay argues that the success of the bird-banding program depended on a fragile balance between the centripetal effects of national coordination and the centrifugal effects of volunteer enthusiasm. For various reasons,
efforts to maintain this balance were largely abandoned by the Bird-Banding Ofﬁce
from the late 1930s onward. Nonetheless, the ﬁrst two decades of the national birdbanding effort provide an example of how a “citizen-science” project that generates
“Big Data” can produce signiﬁcant scientiﬁc results without subordinating the enthusiasms of volunteers to the data-collecting needs of professional scientists.

Bird banding is the practice of attaching metal rings stamped with serial numbers to
the legs of birds so that they can be identiﬁed at a later date. First adopted by European and North American ornithologists on a large scale in the early twentieth century, it can seem rather quaint in comparison to some of the techniques for studying
birds that have since become available. It relies on decidedly low-tech instruments—
bands, nets, pliers, notebooks—and on time spent in the ﬁeld rather than seated before a computer. The amount of data produced by the technique was astounding and
even sometimes overwhelming by the standards of the early twentieth century, but it
can seem small next to the “Big Data” produced by some contemporary ornithological research methods. A satellite-linked electronic tag, for example, is capable of
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tracking the geographical position of a migrating bird on a daily or even hourly basis
even in regions of the world, such as the high seas, where human observers are
sparse. Such tags can produce hundreds or thousands of data points per tagged bird,
in contrast to the one or two typically provided by banding. Meanwhile, citizenscience projects recruit thousands of bird-watchers with smartphones and Internet
connections to share their observations of bird migrations and other phenomena.
Such electronic instruments and networked citizen scientists produce much of the
data upon which today’s ornithological discoveries rest.1
Nonetheless, bird banding continues to play an important role in studies of bird
behavior, and its history offers insights into the dynamics of cooperation and conﬂict
between professional ornithologists and amateur volunteers that are relevant to many
of today’s citizen-science projects. As I describe below, the American bird-banding
effort of the 1920s and 1930s relied heavily on volunteer banders, whose efforts were
coordinated by professional ornithologists at the Bird Banding Ofﬁce (BBO) of
the U.S. Biological Survey in Washington, D.C. Indeed, bird-banding efforts helped
to strengthen the professional-amateur distinction in ornithology, where such boundaries remained ﬂuid much longer than in many other scientiﬁc disciplines.2 By the
1920s, however, the lines were being increasingly starkly drawn, so that professionals such as Frederick C. Lincoln, who headed the BBO from 1920 to 1946, could
lay claim to greater authority than most amateurs who lacked specialized training
and institutional support. In this context, the bird-banding effort was a typical early
twentieth-century elaboration on the long tradition of observation networks in the
sciences—one that harnessed the power of the state, ideals of civic participation,
and the advantages of specialization to create a centripetal knowledge infrastructure
that funneled data from peripheral amateurs to centrally located professionals.3
Narratives of professionalization and centralization do not, however, account for
the full complexity of the early twentieth-century bird-banding effort, which cannot
be reduced to a system for exploiting amateur enthusiasms for the accumulation of
data in a center of calculation.4 The BBO’s dependence on volunteers, whose main
reason for participating was their “passion for birds,”5 meant that professional ornithologists at the center of the network spent a great deal of their time, especially in the
early years of the project, encouraging activities that sustained volunteer enthusiasm
1
On the history of bird banding in the United States, see Jerome A. Jackson, William E. Davis Jr., and
John Tautin, eds., Bird Banding in North America: The First Hundred Years, Memoirs of the Nuttall
Ornithological Club, no. 15 (Cambridge, Mass., 2008); Mark V. Barrow, A Passion for Birds: American
Ornithology after Audubon (Princeton, N.J., 1998), 169–71; Robert M. Wilson, Seeking Refuge: Birds
and Landscapes of the Paciﬁc Flyway (Seattle, 2010), 72–5.
2
Barrow, Passion for Birds (cit. n. 1).
3
The history of observation networks and knowledge infrastructures is large and growing. For a survey with a focus on nonprofessional observers, see Jeremy Vetter, “Introduction: Lay Participation in the
History of Scientiﬁc Observation,” Sci. Context 24 (2011): 127–41. On the relevance of nineteenthcentury historical examples to present-day citizen-science projects, see Gowan Dawson, Chris Lintott,
and Sally Shuttleworth, “Constructing Scientiﬁc Communities: Citizen Science in the Nineteenth and
Twenty-First Centuries,” J. Victorian Cult. 20 (2015): 246–54.
4
On the BBO as a “centre of calculation” that allowed the Biological Survey to “centralize the production of bird-banding data,” see Wilson, Seeking Refuge (cit. n. 1), 74. See also Bruno Latour, Science in Action: How to Follow Scientists and Engineers through Society (Cambridge, Mass., 1987),
219–37; Susan Leigh Star and James R. Griesemer, “Institutional Ecology, ‘Translations,’ and Boundary
Objects: Amateurs and Professionals in Berkeley’s Museum of Vertebrate Zoology, 1907–39,” Soc. Stud.
Sci. 19 (1989): 387– 420.
5
Barrow, Passion for Birds (cit. n. 1).
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but also generated a variety of centrifugal forces that ultimately worked against the
BBO’s own aims. One of the most prominent volunteer “cooperators,” Margaret
Morse Nice, publicly criticized the forms of banding research that mostly directly
supported Lincoln’s aims, for example, while regional associations of volunteer
bird-banders established local data repositories and “emergency” stores of bands in
direct violation of the BBO’s wishes. The success of bird banding in the 1920s
and 1930s depended on an inescapable interplay of centripetal and centrifugal forces.
Inescapable, that is, under particular social, economic, technical, and scientiﬁc
conditions. Over the course of the 1920s and 1930s, it gradually became both desirable and possible for the BBO to reduce its dependence on volunteers and its vulnerability to their centrifugal enthusiasms. It is here that the issue of data management
becomes central. In the early years of the BBO, there were clear links between volunteer enthusiasm, data collection, and scientiﬁc results: the more the BBO fostered
the enthusiasm of volunteers, the more data was generated, and the easier it became to
map migration pathways and census bird populations on a continental scale. As the
volume of data ﬂooding into the BBO increased, however, it became impossible for
its limited staff to stay aﬂoat; at times they fell literally years behind. For this and
other reasons, the BBO was, by the 1930s, more concerned with disciplining volunteers than with fostering their enthusiasms. By the end of the 1940s, a dramatic shift
away from reliance on volunteers had taken place. The history of the U.S. bird-banding
program’s embrace of and subsequent retreat from a balance between centrifugal and
centripetal forces suggests the viability as well as the limits of alternatives to the centripetally oriented projects that dominate “citizen science” today.6
THE EMERGENCE OF ENTHUSIASM FOR BIRD BANDING IN NORTH AMERICA

Enthusiasm for bird banding emerged in Europe and North America at the turn of the
twentieth century primarily in the realm of civic ornithology—that is, the study of
birds outside of the universities and government agencies where highly trained professionals pursued scientiﬁc research.7 In Europe, the Danish schoolteacher Hans
Christian Cornelius Mortensen’s banding studies of the migration of starlings and
other species inspired a wave of imitators in Germany, Great Britain, Hungary, Russia, and elsewhere.8 The ornithologist Johannes Thienemann, for example, recruited a
network of volunteers to support banding-based studies of migration from his base at
the Rossitten bird observatory in East Prussia.9 In North America, civic ornithologists
similarly took the lead in developing bird-banding techniques and recruiting fellow
enthusiasts into ad hoc regional networks. In 1902, for example, Paul Bartsch of the
Smithsonian Institution began attaching aluminum bands inscribed with a serial num6
On issues raised by the boom in citizen-science projects since the 1990s, see Janis L. Dickinson
and Rick Bonney, eds., Citizen Science: Public Participation in Environmental Research (Ithaca,
N.Y., 2012); Abraham Miller-Rushing, Richard Primack, and Rick Bonney, “The History of Public
Participation in Ecological Research,” Frontiers Ecol. Environ. 10 (2012): 285–90.
7
Raf de Bont, Stations in the Field: A History of Place-Based Animal Research (Chicago, 2015),
147–74. See also Lynn Nyhart, “Civic and Economic Zoology in Nineteenth-Century Germany: The
‘Living Communities’ of Karl Möbius,” Isis 98 (1998): 605–30.
8
Many of these European projects were cut short by World War I; Frederick C. Lincoln, “The History and Purposes of Bird Banding,” Auk 38 (1921): 217–28, on 219. See also Harold B. Wood, “The
History of Bird Banding,” Auk 62 (1945): 256–65.
9
De Bont, Stations in the Field (cit. n. 7), 161.
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ber, the year, and the instruction to “Return to Smithsonian Institution” onto herons at a
breeding colony near Washington, D.C.10 Soon after, P. A. Taverner, a young Canadian
architect and amateur ornithologist living in Ann Arbor, Michigan, began distributing
bands to a small network of fellow enthusiasts.11 In 1909, Jack Miner began banding
geese and ducks at his farm in Ontario with bands handstamped with a serial number,
his address, and a Bible quotation.12
In these early efforts, the frequency of “returns”—observations of previously banded
birds—was quite low, and most returns concerned birds recaptured at the site of initial
banding. While this discouraged some ornithologists from adopting the technique, it
motivated others to coordinate banding over increasingly wide geographical scales.
One of the key ﬁgures in this scaling-up process was Leon J. Cole, who had begun
advocating bird banding in 1901.13 In 1908, Cole recruited fellow enthusiasts in the
New Haven Bird Club to join him in a collective banding project. A year later, disappointed at the paltry rate of returns, he proposed establishing an association to carry
forward the effort on a national scale at a meeting of the American Ornithological
Union.14 By the spring of 1910, the American Bird Banding Association (ABBA)
had distributed approximately 5,000 bands, of which 911 had been reported as used
and thirty-one had subsequently been recovered. A recovery rate of 3.4 percent was still
low, but it was already a signiﬁcant improvement over earlier efforts.15 Over the following decade, approximately 22,500 birds were tagged with bands distributed by the
ABBA.16
Sources of enthusiasm for bird banding during this early period can be divided into
two kinds: an enthusiasm for amassing vast collections of data on bird populations,
on one hand, and an enthusiasm for acquiring intimate acquaintance with individual
birds, on the other. Cole was among those who were excited by bird banding as a
technique for amassing vast quantities of data on many birds rather than as an opportunity to study a few birds in great detail. Looking back on the ABBA’s work from
the perspective of the early 1920s, Cole described it as a scheme to “gradually build
up an accumulation of accurate data on bird movements which would be of the
greatest scientiﬁc value” by drawing on “the interest and coöperation of the large
number of amateur bird students in the country.”17 After Cole took a position at
the University of Wisconsin in 1910 and shifted his focus to genetics, the management of the ABBA fell to Howard H. Cleaves, who arranged for a ledger and ﬁling
10
Paul Bartsch, “Notes on the Herons of the District of Columbia,” Smithsonian Misc. Collections
45 (1904): 104–11; Bartsch, “A Note on the First Bird-Banding in America,” Bird-Banding 23 (1952):
59–60.
11
P. A. Taverner, “A Tagged Flicker,” Wilson Bull. 18 (1906): 21–2; Taverner, “Tagging Migrants,”
Auk 23 (1906): 232; W. L. McAtee, “Percy Algernon Taverner, 1875–1947,” Auk 65 (1948): 85–106.
12
On Miner’s banding work in relation to his conservation philosophy, see Tina Loo, States of Nature: Conserving Canada’s Wildlife in the Twentieth Century (Vancouver, 2006), 63–92.
13
Cole later claimed to have been inspired by the use of numbered tags for research on lobsters;
Leon J. Cole, “The Early History of Bird Banding in America,” Wilson Bull. 34, no. 2 (1922):
108– 44. See also Wood, “History” (cit. n. 8), 260.
14
Leon J. Cole, “The Tagging of Wild Birds: Report of Progress in 1909,” Auk 27 (1910): 153–68;
Letter, Leon J. Cole, C. J. Pennock, Louis B. Bishop, Glover M. Allen, and Thomas S. Roberts (Executive Committee of the American Bird Banding Association), New Haven, Conn., 10 February
1910, Wilson Bull. 22 (1910): 53–5.
15
Cole, “Tagging” (cit. n. 14), 157–9.
16
Frederick C. Lincoln, “Some Causes of Mortality among Birds,” Auk 48 (1931): 538– 46, on 539.
17
Cole, “Early History” (cit. n. 13), 109.
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cabinet for banding data to be installed at the Linnaean Society of New York.18 Like
Cole, Cleaves believed that “bird banding is not the work of a limited circle but the
duty of many, and it is only by extensive banding that results of value can be obtained.”19 This was a clearly centripetal view of bird banding, in which a network
of amateurs contribute data to a center of calculation where it will be used by a
few highly trained professionals.
Through the 1910s, however, this centripetal vision remained more aspirational
than real, with the ABBA’s slowly growing collection of bird-banding data languishing mostly unused except by banders eager to discover the fate of the birds they had
banded themselves. One reason was that the rate of returns continued to be so low and
the distribution of banders across the continent so uneven as to make any general conclusions drawn from them highly speculative. This was a function of the small number of people banding birds and of their tendency to band nestlings. Birds too young
to ﬂy were easy to catch and band but also very likely to die before they could be
recaptured. Moreover, most of those involved in bird banding at this time seem to
have had little interest in using the data for panoptic purposes. For them, the ABBA
served as a registry or clearinghouse through which they could discover the fate of
those few birds that they had banded themselves. The ABBA’s central ﬁles seem
never to have been used as the basis for a published study, although the private data
collections assembled by particular banders or research stations often were.20
For most banders, the dream of accumulating massive amounts of data in a repository for centralized study was less appealing than the prospect of receiving free bird
bands and instruction in the proper techniques for using them, which would allow
them to learn more about the fate of individual birds, as well as to take personal credit
for the scientiﬁc ﬁndings that resulted. S. Prentiss Baldwin, a businessman and amateur ornithologist who played a leading role in the development of bird banding in
the United States between the 1910s and 1930s, is a case in point. Baldwin had ﬁrst
begun to trap live birds in the process of exterminating nonnative sparrows on his
estate near Cleveland in the early 1910s. In 1914, after learning about the methods
promoted by the ABBA, he began banding on what was then considered a very large
scale, resulting in about 1,600 birds banded between 1914 and 1918.21 The publication of his methods and ﬁndings in 1919 was widely credited with inspiring a revival
of interest in bird banding.22 In particular, by developing trapping and banding techniques for adult birds, which were harder to catch but more likely than nestlings to be
recaptured, Baldwin’s research reopened the possibility of recovery rates that could
sustain the enthusiasm of amateurs.23

18
Howard H. Cleaves, “What the American Bird Banding Association Has Accomplished during
1912,” Auk 30 (1913): 248–61, on 248–9.
19
Ibid., 253.
20
For an example of a study that used the association’s bands but not the association’s collection of
records, see Edward A. McIlhenny, “An Early Experiment in the Homing Ability of Wildfowl,” BirdBanding 11 (1940): 58–60.
21
S. Charles Kendeigh, “In Memoriam: Samuel Prentiss Baldwin,” Auk 57 (1940): 1–12, on 4.
22
S. Prentiss Baldwin, “Bird-Banding by Means of Systematic Trapping,” Abstr. Proc. Linn. Soc.
N.Y. 31 (1919): 23–56.
23
Baldwin assisted with the preparation of the ﬁrst instructional pamphlet issued by the BBO; Frederick C. Lincoln, Instructions for Bird Banding, U.S. Department of Agriculture, Department Circular 170, Bureau of Biological Survey (Washington, D.C., 1921).
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Baldwin’s interest in bird banding cannot be entirely separated from the dream of a
massive, centralized, continent-wide data set, but neither can it be reduced to it. The
research program he developed eventually led to the banding of tens of thousands of
birds, and in the 1920s and 1930s he contributed signiﬁcantly to the coordination of
effort among bird banders across North America and to the growth of the federal birdbanding program. Still, the centripetal dreams that got Cole’s and Cleaves’s hearts
pumping faster seem to have left Baldwin cold. As one of his ﬁeld assistants recalled
after his death, his goal was never to band “large numbers of individuals for the sake
of a big record” but rather to “obtain all possible information from those that were
handled.”24 Data was vitally important, in other words, but it was small data kept locally rather than Big Data gathered in Washington that mattered most. For such work,
a centralized registry might be helpful, but a centralized data set was largely irrelevant. Like many other banders, Baldwin’s enthusiasm for banding was sustained
by the experience of handling individual birds, investigating their life histories,
and associating with like-minded enthusiasts—not by the idea of handing data over
to a distant center of calculation.
MANAGING DATA AND ENTHUSIASM AT THE BBO

In 1920, the ABBA was disbanded and its functions were taken over by the new BirdBanding Ofﬁce in the United States and by an equivalent ofﬁce in Canada.25 For its
ﬁrst two and a half decades, from 1920 to 1946, the U.S. ofﬁce operated under the
direction of Frederick C. Lincoln. In a memoriam written after Lincoln’s death in
1960, one leading American wildlife conservationist described him as someone
who had had “no hobbies, other than work in his chosen ﬁeld.”26 This paradoxical
formulation suggests the depth of Lincoln’s commitment to ornithology and the blurring of lines between professional and amateur that it entailed. His passion for birds
was already evident during his adolescence in Colorado, where he spent summers
working at the Colorado Museum of Natural History and made the acquaintance
of Alexander Wetmore, an ornithologist with the Biological Survey. In 1920, after
becoming the museum’s curator of ornithology and serving as a pigeon expert in
the U.S. Signal Corps, Lincoln was recruited by the Biological Survey to head the
bird-banding effort. The U.S. government’s interest in bird banding was a result of
the Convention for the Protection of Migratory Birds signed with Canada in 1916,
which obligated both nations to manage bird populations with “due regard to the
zones of temperature and to the distribution, abundance, economic value, breeding
habits, and times of migratory ﬂight” of the species concerned.27 Bird banding promised to provide the data required for such management, but only if it could be successfully coordinated on a national scale.

Kendeigh, “In Memoriam” (cit. n. 21), 5.
E. W. Nelson, “Bird Banding Work Being Taken over by the Biological Survey,” Wilson Bull. 32
(1920): 63– 4.
26
Ira N. Gabrielson, “Obituary,” Auk 79 (1962): 495–9, on 495.
27
U.S. Department of Agriculture, Bureau of Biological Survey, Migratory Bird Treaty, Act, and
Regulations (Washington, D.C., 1920), 5. See Kurkpatrick Dorsey, The Dawn of Conservation Diplomacy: U.S.-Canadian Wildlife Protection Treaties in the Progressive Era (Seattle, 1998), 165–237;
Mark Cioc, The Game of Conservation: International Treaties to Protect the World’s Migratory Animals (Athens, Ohio, 2009), 58–103.
24
25
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After arriving in Washington, Lincoln threw himself into the work of promoting
bird banding as a revolutionary technique for ornithology. “Occupying a position
with the shotgun, the ﬁeld glass and the scalpel,” he wrote in 1926, banding “bids
fair to become the court of last appeal in the determination of many facts concerned
with the migration and life histories of birds.” (ﬁg. 1)28 Lincoln’s proselytizing efforts
were most intense during his ﬁrst few years on the job, when he devoted himself to
inspiring and recruiting a voluntary corps of bird banders while also educating hunters and bird lovers about the importance of reporting recovered bands. In addition to
writing popular articles, he gave interviews to the press and delivered numerous presentations before Boy Scout troops, Audubon societies, nature clubs, and other organizations. Lincoln emphasized the utilitarian purposes of bird banding but also sought
to position it as a way for ordinary citizens to contribute to science while enhancing
their own enjoyment of birds. In an account of the origins of bird banding in the
United States titled “The Romance of the Numbered Band,” most likely written in
the late 1930s, Lincoln noted that the “charm of intimate acquaintance with birds,
brought about by the repeated handling of the same individuals, started a wave of interest and enthusiasm unparalleled in the history of American ornithology.” 29
Rather than discouraging volunteers’ enthusiasm for “intimate acquaintance” with
individual birds, Lincoln actively encouraged it, even while insisting that banders
send their reports to Washington in formats that could be efﬁciently processed for
the purposes of waterfowl management. This balance between encouraging volunteer
enthusiasm and disciplining their data collection was reﬂected in an article on “The
History and Purposes of Bird Banding” that Lincoln published in The Auk in the
spring of 1921.30 The article explained the importance of bird banding for large-scale
migration studies, but it also sought to link bird banding research to popular enthusiasm for bird-watching. It noted the ease with which the nation’s thousands of birdfeeding stations could be converted into banding stations, the variety of research
questions that could be answered, and the harmlessness of the practice. Even the bird
lover most concerned about the welfare of humanity’s feathered friends, it suggested,
could band birds in good conscience. By way of conclusion, the article predicted that
with “the element of anticipation always present, expecting and watching for a bird
marked at some other station or during a previous year, it seems that this new system
of bird banding should ﬁnd a host of enthusiastic participants.”31 This was a message
that Lincoln repeated before a variety of audiences in the early years of the federal
bird-banding program.32
Lincoln’s advocacy efforts soon paid off. In fact, the practice had soon garnered so
much interest that the BBO was forced to limit the number of banding permits it is28

153.
29

Frederick C. Lincoln, “Bird Banding—In Progress and Prospect,” Auk 43 (1926): 153–61, on

The manuscript was written and submitted to Collier’s Magazine but never published; Robert
McCormick to Frederick C. Lincoln, 2 June 1941; Lincoln, “Bird Banding,” n.d., 34 pp. [pages missing], on 13, Box 37, Folder: The Romance of the Numbered Band, Record Group 22, Ofﬁce Files of
Dr. Frederick C. Lincoln, 1917–1960, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park,
Md. (hereafter cited as “Lincoln Files”).
30
Lincoln, “History” (cit. n. 8).
31
Ibid., 227.
32
See, e.g., his presentation to the Naturalist Field Club of Johns Hopkins University in 1924; Frederick C. Lincoln, “Report of Trip to Baltimore, Maryland, Apr. 30, 1924,” n.d., manuscript, 3 pp., on 2,
Box 36, Folder: Reports 1924, Lincoln Files.
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Figure 1. A diagram showing one of the stamped, numbered bands distributed by the BirdBanding Ofﬁce to its cooperators in both open and locked (i.e., attached) states. Source: Frederick C. Lincoln, Instructions for Banding Birds (Washington, D.C., 1924), 20, ﬁg. 21.

sued. This was not because the would-be banders were unqualiﬁed or because the
data they planned to collect would not have been useful, but because the ofﬁce
was unable to process the ﬂood of data with which it was already being inundated.
By the summer of 1926 there were 1,133 active cooperators and around one hundred
more planning to begin banding soon. Since the establishment of the BBO, volunteers had banded more than 203,000 birds, from which more than 9,300 returns
had been received (a rate of about 4.6 percent).33 The BBO’s inability to manage this
ﬂow had direct consequences for Lincoln’s efforts to generate enthusiasm for the new
technique. In the late 1920s, the BBO began to “handle the banding work ‘with
brakes on,’ that is, deﬁnite effort [was] made to refrain from undue publicity or campaigns that would have the effect of greatly increasing the number of cooperators.”34
Facing practical limits to the amount of data that could be collected, processed,
stored, and analyzed given available resources, Lincoln shifted his focus from inspiring interest in banding to recruiting precisely the right kind of cooperator and ensuring that the work of existing cooperators was maximally useful for the BBO. In light
of the ofﬁce’s origins in the 1916 convention, Lincoln believed the ideal bander was
one who operated a feeding station at which hundreds or thousands of waterfowl
were banded yearly and who submitted accurate banding reports and returns in a
timely manner, thereby contributing to the continental-scale surveys upon which water33
Frederick C. Lincoln, Memorandum for Chief of Bureau, 19 June 1926, 1 p., Box 36, Folder: Reports 1926, Lincoln Files.
34
Frederick C. Lincoln, Memorandum for Dr. Bell, 13 July 1928, 3 pp., on 2, Box 36, Folder: Reports 1928, Lincoln Files.
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fowl management depended. From the mid-1920s onwards, the BBO sought to discourage the applications of would-be cooperators who did not intend to establish
large-scale trapping stations and to revoke the permits of those whose work it deemed
to be of a “desultory character.”35 By the late 1930s, it was rejecting more than one permit application per day.36 Nonetheless, because Lincoln found it difﬁcult to turn down
candidates who promised to add coverage of important species or geographical areas,
the number of permit-holding volunteers and unprocessed reports continued to increase.
Over the course of the 1920s and 1930s, the focus of Lincoln’s attention thus shifted
from publicity and recruitment toward clerical workﬂow and data management. Within
the ﬁrst few years of the BBO’s founding, for example, he recognized that writing to
contributors individually to acknowledge receipt of their data was consuming an inordinate amount of his time. By 1923, about 59 percent of the 4,687 communications that
crossed his desk were in the form of preprinted postcards rather than letters or memos.37
For more complex communications, Lincoln established Bird Banding Notes, which
disseminated trapping and banding techniques and reported exemplary or particularly
exciting returns. Bird Banding Notes was also used to encourage cooperators to complete reporting cards with pen rather than pencil, to submit reports at regular time intervals, to avoid duplicating reports, and to ensure that all information sent was correct
and complete. Failing to comply with any of these requirements, cooperators were regularly warned, could result in revocation of their banding permits.38 In this way, the
challenges of data management helped to reorient the relationship between the BBO
and its cooperators from individual, idiosyncratic, and encouraging to collective, standardized, and disciplinary.
The ﬂood of data also inspired a series of efforts aimed at reforming datamanagement practices within the BBO. At ﬁrst, when the number of banders remained in the hundreds rather than thousands, the clerical work of transcribing and
ﬁling banding reports seemed manageable (ﬁg. 2). In 1922, Lincoln conﬁdently told
his supervisor that the “system for the mechanical part of the work is now very nearly
automatic, and appears to admit of inﬁnite expansion.”39 As the number of cooperators’ reports grew, however, he was forced to implement further reforms because of
“the greatly increased volume of work and lack of additional assistance.”40 Some of
these reforms addressed minor matters of workﬂow; others involved signiﬁcant reorganizations of the data. In 1925, for example, the BBO began separating the “dead”
ﬁles of birds banded so long ago that they were unlikely to be observed again from
more recent “live” records.41 In 1926, Lincoln reported that “a complete change in
35
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Figure 2. A sample record card reporting the tagging of an adult male robin at the National
Zoological Park in Washington, D.C., on 5 May 1923, and its recapture at the same site on 6
and 10 May. Source: Frederick C. Lincoln, Instructions for Banding Birds (Washington, D.C.,
1924), 24, ﬁg. 27.

system” for the banding ﬁles was speeding the work of banders and clerical staff.42
But none of these reforms remained satisfactory for long. In 1929, the ofﬁce fell a
full year behind schedule, and Lincoln admitted that “we are totally unable to adequately handle the volume of work with the personnel available.”43 In the midst of
an unprecedented economic disaster, funds for additional personnel were not forthcoming. The BBO continued to fall behind, and the tone of Lincoln’s memos became
increasingly desperate.44
With no additional personnel forthcoming, mechanization offered a ray of hope. In
1929, the BBO acquired an electric card-sorting machine that promised to facilitate
the censusing of bird populations.45 The American Wild Fowlers, a private conservation association, donated funds to hire a card puncher who spent ﬁve weeks coding,
42
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punching, and sorting about 30,000 cards, and the Machine Tabulating and Computing Section of the Bureau of Agricultural Economics offered the use of its tabulating
machine.46 Lincoln described the turn to mechanization in practical but also moral
terms; it would allow the BBO to meet its “responsibility” to cooperators to analyze
the data it had accumulated.47 While most bird banders remained interested mainly in
the fates of their own birds, the credibility of the BBO depended on its making some
use of the data it was collecting. At the same time, mechanization provided a new
opportunity to tighten the BBO’s control over cooperators. At the beginning of 1930,
cooperators were informed that new reports and returns were to be submitted only on
simpliﬁed cards that could be directly coded and punched at the BBO.48 As data processing became mechanized, cooperators’ ﬂexibility decreased.
Automation offered some real increases in efﬁciency and reliability, but it did little
to solve the problem of information overload. A few years later, Lincoln was still begging his superiors for at least one more clerk.49 Triage became necessary: reports of
newly banded birds were given priority, since they were required for making sense of
later returns; meanwhile, the processing of returns was postponed to the indeﬁnite
future. By the summer of 1938, the BBO had accumulated approximately 40,000 unprocessed reports, amounting to the entirety of the returns from the previous two
years.50 This could be seen as a product of poor management and insufﬁcient resources, but it can also be understood as the almost inevitable result of seeking to accumulate as much data as possible. Given the frictions and unexpected challenges of
data management, it was easy for “as much as possible” to become “a bit more than
possible.” Lincoln shared some responsibility for this state of things, inasmuch as his
annual request for additional staff was usually accompanied by the admission that the
number of cooperators and banded birds continued to increase.51 Information overload and data hunger went hand in hand.
CENTRIFUGAL ENTHUSIASMS ON THE AMATEUR PERIPHERY

The volunteers who ﬂooded the BBO with data were often highly educated, passionately committed to ornithology, and hungry for data in their own way. Among them
was Margaret Morse Nice, who, like many other American women of her generation,
was forced to end her formal scientiﬁc training before completing her doctorate.
Nonetheless, she succeeded in becoming one of the most respected American orni-
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thologists of the mid-twentieth century on the basis of rigorous empirical studies and
wide reading of North American and European ornithological literature.52 Nice
achieved this status while serving as one of the BBO’s cooperators and, for many
years, as an associate editor of the journal Bird-Banding. Like many of her fellow
banders, Nice both depended on and contributed to the BBO’s centralizing efforts,
which exploited the enthusiasm of volunteers like herself to produce data for professionals while also providing tools that enabled amateurs to pursue their own research
interests. Nice played a leading role in fostering practices that pulled away from centralized data gathering and encouraged each bander to tackle important scientiﬁc
problems that could be addressed using a small set of carefully observed birds.
Though harder to track through the historical record, such centrifugal practices were
as important as the centripetal practices that pulled banding data into Lincoln’s ofﬁce
in Washington.
Implicit in many of her research articles, Nice’s vision of banding as a centrifugal,
peripheral, and individual practice was rendered explicit in an article titled “The Opportunity of Bird-Banding,” which appeared in Bird-Banding in 1934. As exhortatory in tone as some of the newsletters published by the BBO around the same time,
the article upbraided Nice’s fellow banders for “apparently believing that banding is
merely a means of studying migration” and thus being satisﬁed to “capture as many
birds as they possibly can, simply attaching the numbered band and that is the last
they see or hear of the vast majority of their subjects.”53 Although Nice mentioned
neither Lincoln nor the BBO by name, it was precisely their approach to banding that
she was attacking. Willing to sacriﬁce quantity for quality and breadth for depth, Nice
argued that signiﬁcant scientiﬁc discoveries would emerge if banders would only
“study a few birds carefully.”54 What Nice meant by this was life-history research
of the kind that had occupied Baldwin, whose most striking result had concerned
the mate ﬁdelity of house wrens—a topic for which the individual identiﬁcation provided by banding was essential but the collection of data in a centralized repository
was irrelevant.55
Nice’s studies of song sparrows similarly depended on individual identiﬁcation
over multiple seasons, for which bands from the BBO and a federal banding permit
were essential but the centralized data set that Lincoln was painstakingly assembling
was not.56 Using additional colored celluloid bands that allowed her to identify individual birds from a distance, Nice conducted a study of breeding behavior that was
widely recognized upon its publication in 1937 as “the ﬁnest and most comprehen52
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sive study ever made of any North American bird.”57 By disseminating her own notetaking and data-recording methods through Bird-Banding, Nice helped to promote
such studies among her fellow volunteer banders.58 She was not opposed to studies
of migration, to cooperative work, or to submitting data to the BBO, but she was most
passionate about the opportunities that banding opened up for local observation of
phenomena such as territoriality. Sending reports to Washington was a bureaucratic
obligation that had to be fulﬁlled before the real work of closely observing a few individual birds could begin.
Nice’s example suggests that cooperators could participate in the federal banding
program even while pursuing research objectives that were independent of it or even
opposed to it. The centrifugal forces that created tension between the BBO and the
volunteers upon whom it depended are also visible in the role played by regional
bird-banding associations in the 1920s and 1930s. In addition to administering a registry of bird bands, the ABBA had served as a form of sociability for bird banders.
After its dissolution in 1920, a social void was created that the BBO could not ﬁll, even
though it recognized that such associations could help it achieve its data-gathering
goals. In the early 1920s, with Lincoln’s encouragement, volunteers ﬁlled this void
by establishing the Western Bird Banding Association, the Northeastern Bird Banding
Association, the Eastern Bird Banding Association, and the Inland Bird Banding Association. These associations collected dues, distributed bulletins or newsletters, organized meetings of banders, publicized banding in the press, and defended bird banding against its critics.59
Lincoln encouraged these organizations as a way to swell the ranks of banders,
coordinate “chains of stations” that could trap migrating birds repeatedly, and encourage the public to report found bands.60 In small ways, the BBO even offered material
support for the regional associations. In 1923, for example, to help the Inland Bird
Banding Association recruit members who were not themselves active banders, Lincoln offered to include them on the mailing list for Bird Banding Notes.61 Nonetheless, tensions between the regional associations and the BBO sometimes posed a real
threat to the harmonious functioning of the federal bird-banding program. The Western Bird Banding Association, for example, whose members tended to see their needs
as distinct from those in other regions of the country, established an “emergency” reserve of bird bands that it distributed to its members during periods of heavy migration. The BBO only grudgingly tolerated such emergency stores, since they put the re-
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gional association in the position of knowing who was using a particular set of bands
before the ofﬁce itself did.62
In addition to tensions over emergency bands, the establishment of regional data
repositories also raised hackles at the BBO, particularly when cooperators began
sending their original data ﬁrst to the regional repository and only subsequently to
Washington, if at all. “There is no objection to cooperators’ sending copies of their
records to their local organizations if they so desire,” the BBO stressed, “but the original records should be sent direct to the Bureau.”63 The regional associations also
sometimes resisted the BBO’s attempts to limit the number of cooperators. In 1930,
for example, as the BBO was turning down applications from would-be banders on
a daily basis, one of the leaders of the Northeastern Bird-Banding Association argued in the pages of Bird-Banding that “more collaborators are needed” to ﬁll the
gaps in the existing coverage of trapping stations.64 Volunteers who responded to this
call must have been disappointed when they received a form letter from the BBO informing them that it could not accept new cooperators. Volunteers’ desire to study the
life histories of individual birds rather than the migrations of populations, to maintain
local autonomy and the ability to respond quickly to changing conditions, and to expand coverage in their own regions regardless of the number of cooperators nationally thus sometimes came into direct conﬂict with the BBO’s aims.
THE TURN AWAY FROM VOLUNTEERS

Throughout the 1920s and 1930s, the BBO sought to balance its desire for data suited
to the management of continental waterfowl populations with the necessity of sustaining the enthusiasm of its volunteer cooperators, whose own priorities sometimes
pulled in contradictory directions. Certain frictions were generated by the very activities that helped to lubricate the ﬂow of data.65 The result of this conﬂictual cooperation was several decades of remarkable scientiﬁc productivity. Under Lincoln’s
leadership, the BBO used banding data collected by volunteers to make two major
contributions to the challenges of continental waterfowl management. The ﬁrst was
the mapping of waterfowl migration along four North American “ﬂyways,” which
made it possible to develop management plans tailored to each population. The management of volunteer banders on a continental scale thus made possible the management of waterfowl on a continental scale.66 The second major contribution was
a method for calculating the size of each of these distinct populations on the basis
of the ratio between banded and unbanded birds in a particular sample. The fact that
62
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this statistic is still known among wildlife biologists as the “Lincoln index” is largely a
consequence of his ability to marshal and discipline the enthusiasm of the volunteers
who produced the data that made it useful.67 At the same time, volunteer banders such
as Nice made major contributions to the study of life histories and behavior that dovetailed with the emerging ﬁeld of ethology in Europe.68
The dynamic tension between centripetal and centrifugal forces that characterized
the bird-banding program during its ﬁrst two decades was neither inevitable nor permanent. It was the result of particular conditions and choices that began to change in
the late 1930s. In 1938, the BBO decided to concentrate the banding of ducks, geese,
and other waterfowl in federal and state wildlife refuges, effectively limiting volunteers to the banding of nongame birds. This was a response to a prohibition on the
use of decoys and bait by hunters that had been implemented following a catastrophic drop in continental waterfowl populations during the drought years of the
early 1930s.69 Without decoys or bait, many banding stations could no longer attract
waterfowl. A decade earlier, the loss of these volunteer-operated banding stations
would have severely damaged the bird-banding program, but by the late 1930s an
expanding federal and state bureaucracy for wildlife management was available to
take up the slack. Ironically, this wildlife bureaucracy was one of the results of the
success of the volunteer-driven bird-banding program, which had provided data supporting the establishment of new regulations and refuges.70
In the early 1940s, the shift from volunteers to professional banders continued with
the reorganization of the federal government’s conservation agencies and the onset of
World War II. In 1940, the Biological Survey was moved from the Department of
Agriculture to the Department of the Interior, where it became part of the new Fish
and Wildlife Service.71 After the move, survey employees faced increased pressure
to focus on management-relevant research. Within the BBO, this had the effect of accelerating the shift to large-scale, professional waterfowl banding. The onset of war
further de-emphasized volunteers and research on nongame birds, while also hampering the bird-banding effort as a whole. Following the U.S. declaration of war in December 1941, Lincoln attempted to justify bird banding by characterizing waterfowl
as a meat source that would help to “ﬁll the national larder,” but bird banding was not
a high priority for the U.S. government in the early 1940s.72 Even before 1941, many
67
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volunteer banders had already been drafted into the military or were engaged in other
defense-related activities that prevented them from contributing.73 During the war,
aluminum for bird bands became scarce, and it became virtually impossible for
BBO staff to travel.74 Reduced to a skeleton crew, the BBO suspended its research
work and devoted itself entirely to data management in the hope that the records
would be useful when research resumed after the war.75
Under these conditions, the BBO relied even more heavily than before on banding
work at federal wildlife refuges, and it contemplated establishing new banding stations of its own to “replace volunteer stations that were formerly in operation,” although these plans were also hindered by the war.76 After wartime restrictions were
lifted, the number of birds banded annually quickly recovered, but the shift from volunteers to professionals that had begun in the late 1930s continued. In 1949, the BBO
reported that the total number of cooperators had doubled over the previous year,
bringing it nearly back to prewar levels. One thing had changed, however: “Whereas
before the war the cooperators were almost all volunteers, more and more professional wildlife workers are now utilizing banding.”77 More than half of the banding
was now being done by employees of the Fish and Wildlife Service, state game agencies, or university-based research units.78
The professionalization of bird banding that began in the late 1930s and was accelerated by wartime conditions had the effect of changing the BBO’s cost-beneﬁt calculation such that the cost of discouraging volunteers was now outweighed by the
beneﬁts of standardizing data. This changing calculation was reﬂected in the tone
of the BBO’s communications with cooperators. The ﬁrst postwar issue of Bird
Banding Notes in 1946 included several pages of cautions, warnings, and requests,
among them the reminder that “bird-banding cooperators should remember that this
is a scientiﬁc study and that their own pleasure in the work is incidental.”79 Admonishments of this kind were not entirely unprecedented, but they were soon accompanied by strictly enforced new reporting requirements that took even some veteran
banders aback. In the June 1948 issue of Bird Banding Notes, the BBO introduced
a number of new rules effective by the end of the month and threatened to withhold
new bands from cooperators who failed to immediately comply. At the same time, it
73
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pruned from its mailing list hundreds of cooperators who had been “delinquent” in
submitting data.80 Volunteers who did not hastily compile and submit their records
in the new format found themselves suddenly cut off from the free bands, banding
permits, forms of sociality, and scientiﬁc legitimation offered by the bird-banding
program.
The new tone of the BBO’s communications did not go unnoticed by its volunteer
cooperators. In the wake of the June 1948 announcement, the editor of the Western
Bird Banding Association’s newsletter complained that the ofﬁce’s high-handed approach “tends to make the volunteer give thought to other ﬁelds of endeavor where
the demands are less binding.” After all, he added, volunteers were contributing their
time, expertise, and often signiﬁcant ﬁnancial investments in equipment and supplies
to the national bird-banding program; it hardly seemed fair to ask them to reformat
their data on a moment’s notice.81 Lincoln’s replacement as head of the BBO, Seth
H. Low, defended the need for strict standards given the limited staff available to handle reports, asking volunteers to “place the good of the program as a whole ahead of
individual inconveniences.”82 In subsequent years, when Low canceled plans to attend their annual meeting or denied their requests for “emergency” stores of bands,
members of the Western Bird Banding Association detected clear signs that the value
of their contributions had declined in the eyes of the BBO.83
In the postwar decades, many American bird lovers continued to ﬁnd banding rewarding, but they no longer played the central role in the BBO’s research efforts that
they had in the interwar years. Volunteers continued to make unique contributions by
focusing on nongame birds and providing coverage in regions where professional
and institutionally based banders were thin on the ground. As its dependence on volunteers decreased, however, the BBO became less interested in facilitating centrifugal activities that had been a source of both tension and enthusiasm in the prewar decades. The postwar expansion in federal support for wildlife research ﬂooded the
BBO with reports from professional banders and exacerbated the sense among volunteers that their work was of secondary importance.84 Meanwhile, employees of
state ﬁsh and game agencies began to take a serious interest in banding when they
realized it could help them challenge restrictive federal hunting regulations.85 In
the 1950s, the Bird Banding Laboratory (as it had been renamed after moving into
new facilities at the Patuxent Wildlife Research Center in Maryland) devoted an enor“Schedules,” Bird Banding Notes 4 (1948): 2–5; “Mailing List,” ibid., 8.
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mous amount of effort to recoding and punching records of waterfowl and other game
birds gathered since 1921, but it decided not to do so for nongame birds.86 This datamanagement decision reﬂected the main organizational challenge of the Bird Banding Laboratory in the postwar decades, which was to coordinate the work of government agencies and university research units and to resolve tensions between state and
federal wildlife management—not to balance the needs of the federal data-collection
effort with the enthusiasms of amateur volunteers.87
The change in the BBO’s approach to its volunteers resonated with broader postwar shifts in the role of experts in government and their relation to nonexpert citizens.
As the cultivation of a corps of volunteer cooperators faded in importance for the Fish
and Wildlife Service, and as new technologies of electronic tracking were developed
that made it possible to study bird migration without needing to rely on a network of
human observers, wildlife biologists and ornithologists increasingly directed their efforts toward “selling” conservation to an undifferentiated public that was increasingly
emerging as the target of “public relations.”88 The Fish and Wildlife Service’s postwar leadership decided that fostering a network of thousands of committed, enthusiastic, and highly trained—if also sometimes fractious and unreliable—volunteers was
a lower priority than it had been during the interwar years. Instead it focused on calculating ever more accurate estimates of waterfowl populations and maps of migratory pathways that could be used to overcome the resistance of state governments to
federal regulation, as well as to sell conservation to a sometimes skeptical public.
DATA, DEMOCRACY, AND CITIZEN SCIENCE

Large-scale bird-banding programs have now been active in North America for
nearly a century, and there are no indications that the practice will soon be abandoned. In recent years, more than a million birds have been banded annually in the
United States.89 In absolute terms, the number of banders is signiﬁcantly larger than
it was in Lincoln’s day; one estimate published in the early 2000s put the total number of North American bird banders at more than 6,100 individuals.90 Even as other
techniques have grown in importance, the practice continues to be seen as essential to
86
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the management and conservation of waterfowl and other bird populations.91 Moreover, it continues to attract volunteers with deep expertise who are passionate about
both birds and data. Nonetheless, much has changed since the interwar years. Not
only is most banding done by professionals, as it has been since the late 1940s,
but even volunteer banding has become more hierarchical and expert led, in part because of efforts to minimize the risk of harm to banded birds. Applicants for “master
bander” permits are now required to go through extensive training and submit a “complete research proposal” to the Bird Banding Laboratory before they are issued a permit.92 Tellingly, the estimate of 6,100 banders cited above includes “federal and state
conservation agencies; university associates; amateur ornithologists; bird observatories; environmental centers; non-governmental organizations; environmental consulting ﬁrms, and other private sector businesses.”93 Volunteer banders of the kind who
dominated the practice in the interwar years—particularly those who are unafﬁliated
with a research institution or nongovernmental conservation organization—make up
a small proportion of this total.
Given these changes and the development of alternate ways of studying birds, the
ongoing relevance of the early decades of large-scale bird banding in the United
States might not be immediately apparent, especially given the extent to which the
social conditions for volunteer participation in scientiﬁc research have changed. In
the ﬁrst half of the twentieth century, ﬁgures such as Baldwin, the retired businessman devoted to scientiﬁc research, and Nice, the highly trained ornithologist unable
to advance professionally because of her gender, had the ﬁnancial and intellectual resources necessary to transform their passion for birds into world-class research. Today, retired businessmen are more likely to donate money to scientiﬁc institutions
than they are to practice science themselves, and it is less likely that a woman not
only as passionate about research but also as highly talented and trained for it as Nice
was would be relegated to the position of volunteer or amateur. Moreover, today’s
advocates of citizen science are eager to engage a much broader range of people than
were targeted by bird-banding efforts in the early twentieth century—for example,
those with casual interest, minimal scientiﬁc training, or social and economic disadvantages. The emergence of the concept of “citizen science” in the 1990s reﬂects the
democratization of participatory hopes beyond the elitism of much early twentiethcentury amateur science.94
What, then, is to be learned from a way of structuring the relationship between volunteer amateurs and professional experts that depended, in part, on social conditions
and aspirations that no longer exist? I have tried to capture one lesson with the awkward metaphors of centrifugal and centripetal force—awkward not least because the
former is usually understood to be a ﬁctitious or illusory force. The metaphor is none-
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theless apposite inasmuch as it expresses the twofold productivity and inherent contradictions of the nationally coordinated bird-banding program that was launched under the aegis of the BBO in 1920. The BBO operated as a classic center of calculation
in Bruno Latour’s sense of the term, accumulating data and power through the circulation and accumulation of “immutable mobiles” at an institution of centralized power.95
At the same time, however—and in some cases despite itself—it also inspired and facilitated a burst in technical creativity and scientiﬁc sociality at the peripheries of professional ornithology, one that resulted in scientiﬁc insights that were no less valid and
inﬂuential than those achieved by Lincoln in Washington. Arising within a single system of relationships and from some of the very same causes, these forces often pushed
in opposite directions. Bird banding in the interwar period was simultaneously a means
of collecting data and of empowering citizens, of making professionals and of making
amateurs.
Today’s citizen-science projects are motivated both by a desire to collect data by
taking advantage of amateur enthusiasms and by a desire to educate and engage citizens in the production of scientiﬁc knowledge. Much of the scholarship on citizen
science over the past decade or so seeks to address the tensions between these two
goals. Projects that are equally successful at meeting professional scientists’ data needs
and at educating and engaging the public have proven difﬁcult to fashion, though some
do better than others. The professional scientists who lead some of the most successful
centripetally oriented projects, such as the Cornell Laboratory of Ornithology’s mapping of bird distributions on the basis of volunteer observations, tend to characterize
the citizen scientist as a data collector rather than as a data interpreter, let alone independent initiator of scientiﬁc investigations. Citizen science becomes the process of
“enlist[ing] the public in collecting large quantities of data across an array of habitats
and locations over long spans of time.”96 In projects that take this approach, citizens can
easily be reduced to sensors and the relationship between scientist and volunteer to
quality control.97 Meanwhile, centrifugal projects such as do-it-yourself pollution monitoring seek to provide tools to nonprofessionals in response to community needs. But
the research they enable is similarly limited, in most cases, to the production of data that
must be interpreted and endorsed by experts to become authoritative.98
The boom in citizen-science projects since the 1990s, which has often been framed
as a democratizing move, has thus had some ironically centralizing and hierarchizing
consequences. Even as more and more citizens have been inspired to participate in
scientiﬁc research, the scope of their participation has been increasingly narrowed.
This narrowing is linked to the idea that the greatest opportunities and challenges
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for scientiﬁc research today arise from the possibility of accumulating vast amounts
of data. In this data-centric vision of science, where quantity is privileged over quality
and pattern matching is privileged over interpretation, citizens are seen as capable of
contributing to science either as collectors of otherwise inaccessible data or as cognitive resources to be harnessed for purposes of classiﬁcation and description. These
activities are, of course, only a small subset of the range of activities that have conventionally been thought to constitute “science.” The interwar bird-banding program
described here provides some perspective on this narrowing of scope for nonprofessional participation in science. It offers an example of an approach that explicitly, if
sometimes begrudgingly, sought to satisfy both the centripetal data hunger of professional scientists and the centrifugal investigations and enthusiasms of amateurs. In
practice, it seems likely that many of today’s centripetal citizen-science projects are,
intentionally or not, already being subverted for purposes other than those intended
by their designers. Embracing that possibility might be a way for such projects to avoid
reinforcing existing hierarchies of expertise and contributing to the impoverishment of
our collective notion of citizenship.

